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Abstract—Consider a communication network represented by
a directed graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and
E is the set of point-to-point channels in the network. On the
network a secure message M is transmitted, and there may exist
wiretappers who want to obtain information about the message.
In secure network coding, we aim to find a network code which
can protect the message against the wiretapper whose power
is constrained. Cai and Yeung [5] studied the model in which
the wiretapper can access any one but not more than one set of
channels, called a wiretap set, out of a collection A of all possible
wiretap sets. In order to protect the message, the message needs to
be mixed with a random key K. They proved tight fundamental
performance bounds when A consists of all subsets of E of a fixed
size r. However, beyond this special case, obtaining such bounds
is much more difficult. In this paper, we investigate the problem
when A consists of arbitrary subsets of E and obtain the following
results: 1) an upper bound on H(M); 2) a lower bound on H(K)
in terms of H(M). The upper bound on H(M) is explicit, while
the lower bound on H(K) can be computed in polynomial time
when |A| is fixed. The tightness of the lower bound for the point-
to-point communication system is also proved.
Index Terms—Information inequality, perfect secrecy, perfor-
mance bounds, secure network coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN classical information-theoretic cryptography, when weneed to send a private message to a receiver in the presence
of wiretappers, in order to protect the message, we encrypt
the message with a random key and send the ciphertext to the
receiver. A wiretapper who has no access to the key can know
nothing about the message by only observing the ciphertext, in
the sense that the ciphertext and the message are statistically
independent. On the other hand, the receiver obtains the key
via a “secure” channel and use it to decrypt the ciphertext to
recover the private message. The best known such model is the
one-time pad system studied by Shannon [1], which requires
the minimal amount of randomness for the key.
The one-time pad system was generalized to secret sharing
by Blakley [2] and Shamir [3]. Ozarow and Wyner [4] also
studied a similar problem which they called the wiretap
channel II. In this model, information is sent to the receiver
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through a number of point-to-point channels. It is assumed
that the wiretapper can access any one but not more than one
set of channels, called a wiretap set, out of a collection A of
all possible wiretap sets, where A is specified by the problem
under consideration. For example, A could be the collection
of all wiretap sets each containing a single channel. In this
case, the wiretapper can access any one but not more than
one channel. The strategy to protect the private message is the
same as that in classical information-theoretic cryptography.
Specifically, the private message and the random key are
combined by means of a coding scheme, so that a wiretapper
observes some mixtures of the message and the key, where
these mixtures are statistically independent of the message. On
the other hand, the receiver node can decode the message from
the information received on all the channels. Note that in secret
sharing and its subsequent generalizations, it is assumed that
the key is available only to the transmitter and transmission
in all the channels is noiseless.
Cai and Yeung [5] generalized secret sharing to secure
network coding, in which a private message is sent to possibly
more than one receiver through a network of point-to-point
channels. The model they studied, which we refer to as the
wiretap network (see also El Rouayheb and Soljanin [6]), is
described as follows. In this model, the assumptions about
the wiretapper and the strategy to protect the private message
are the same as in the wiretap channel II. The significant
difference is that there exist intermediate nodes in the network
that can encode, and there may be more than one receiver
node. The solution is that we send both the private message
and the key via a network coding scheme, so that a wiretapper
can only observe some mixtures of the message and the
key, where the mixtures are statistically independent of the
message. On the other hand, a receiver node can recover the
private message by decoding the information received from its
input channels. Note that when A is the empty set, the wiretap
network reduces to the original network coding model studied
in Ahlswede et al. [7].
In [5], a condition for the existence of secure linear network
codes was proved and a construction of such codes was
proposed. The code in [5] suffers from the pitfall that the
required alphabet size is larger than |A|. Feldman et al. [8]
generalize and simplify the method in [5]. They derived trade-
off between security, the alphabet size and the multicast rate.
Under their result, the alphabet size in [5] can be greatly
reduced if a small amount of overall capacity is given up.
In [6], El Rouayheb and Soljanin regarded the secure network
coding problem as a network generalization of the model in
wiretap channel II and showed that the transmitted information
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2can be secured by using the coset coding scheme in [4] at the
source on top of the existing network code. Moreover, their
code is equivalent to the code in [5] but the required alphabet
size is much smaller. The optimal code constructions in [5],
[8], and [6] have a common strategy: they first construct a
code on the message and the key at the source node and then
transmit the source code via a network code, which depends
on the code at the source node. In Cai & Yeung [9] and Zhang
& Yeung [10], a general security condition for multi-source
network code was presented.
The performance of a secure network coding scheme is
measured by two quantities: the size of the message and the
size of the key. In designing a secure network coding scheme,
we want to maximize the size of the message and at the same
time minimize the size of the key. The latter is necessary
because in cryptography, randomness is regarded as a resource.
In [5], when the collection A of all wiretap sets consists of all
subsets of channels whose sizes are at most some constant r,
an upper bound on the size of the message and a lower bound
on the size of the random key were obtained. Both of these
bounds are tight for this special case. In this paper, we extend
these bounds to the general case.
Cui et al. [11] studied secure network coding in a single-
source single-sink network with unequal channel capacities.
The set of wiretap sets is arbitrary and randomness can be
generated at the intermediate nodes. The aim is to find the
maximal source-sink communication rate, i.e., the secrecy
capacity. They give a cut-set bound on the secrecy capacity
and show that the cut-set bound is not achievable in general.
Some achievable strategies are proposed and the computational
complexity to determine the secrecy capacity is studied.
Secure network coding was also generalized from different
perspectives. Bhattad and Narayanan [12] introduced weakly
secure network coding, where it is required that wiretappers
cannot decode any part of the source message. In this model,
a weakly secure network code can be used to avoid trading
off the throughput. In [13], Harada and Yamamoto studied
the strongly r-secure linear network code which can protect
the source message such that a wiretapper can obtain no
information about any s components of the source message
by accessing n − s channels provided that the maximum
flows to all the sink nodes are at least n, where s ≤ n − r.
A polynomial-time algorithm was proposed to construct the
strongly r-secure linear network code. They also showed that
strong security contains weak security as a special case.
Secure network coding with error correction was studied
by Ngai and Yeung [14], where they proposed a construction
of secure error-correcting (SEC) network code which can
protect the message from wiretapping, random errors and
errors injected by the wiretapper. They further showed the
optimality of their construction.
Security network coding was also well studied from a
different point of view, see [15]–[19] for other related results.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this work, we focus on the wiretap network model
proposed in [5] and aim to obtain some new performance
bounds. Denote the network by G = (V , E), where V is the set
of nodes and E is the set of edges, each representing a point-to-
point noiseless channel in the network. In this work, we use the
terms “edge” and “channel” interchangeably. On each edge e, a
symbol from some transmission alphabet F can be transmitted.
In this sense we say that each channel has unit capacity. We
assume that G is a directed acyclic multigraph, namely there
can be multiple edges between each pair of nodes.
A wiretap network consists of the following components:
1) Source node s: The node set V contains a node s, called
the source node, where a random message M taking
values in an alphabet M, called the message set, is
generated.
2) Set of user nodes U: A user node is a node in V which is
fully accessed by a legal user who is required to receive
the random message M with zero error. There is generally
more than one user node in a network. The set of user
nodes is denoted by U . For each u ∈ U , let maxflow(u)
denote the value of a maximum flow from the source
node s to node u.
3) Collection of sets of wiretap edges A: A is a collection
of arbitrary subsets of the edge set E , called a wiretap
set. The wiretapper can access any A ∈ A but not more
than one subset in A at the same time. The wiretap set A
chosen by the wiretapper is fixed before communication.
The sender can know A before communication but cannot
figure out the exact A.
We denote such a wiretap network by the tuple (G, s, U , A).
A. Admissible Code
We assume that the message M is generated at the source
node according to an arbitrary distribution on the message set
M. Let K be a random variable independent of M , called
the key, that takes values in an alphabet K according to the
uniform distribution.
For each node v of the network G, we denote the set of the
input edges and the set of the output edges of v by In(v) and
Out(v), respectively. A code for a wiretap network consists
of a set of local encoding mappings {φe : e ∈ E} such that
for all e, φe is a function from M×K to F if e ∈ Out(s),
and is a function from F |In(t)| to F if e ∈ Out(t) for t 6= s.
For e ∈ E , let Ye be the random symbol in F transmitted on
channel e; i.e., the value of φe. For a subset B of E , denote
(Ye : e ∈ B) by YB .
To complete the description of a code, we have to specify
the order in which the channels send the indices, called the
encoding order. Since the graph G is acyclic, it defines a partial
order on the node set V . Then the nodes in V can be indexed
in a way such that for two nodes t and t′, if there is a channel
from node t to node t′, then t < t′. According to this indexing,
node t sends indices in its output channels before node t′ if
and only if t < t′. The order in which the channels within the
set of output channels of a node send the indices is immaterial.
The important point here is that whenever a channel sends an
index, all the indices necessary for encoding have already been
received. A code defined as such induces a function Φu from
M×K to F |In(u)| for all user nodes u ∈ U , where the value
3of Φu denotes the indices received by the user node u in its
input channels.
In the wiretap network model, a code {φe : e ∈ E} should
satisfy the following two conditions:
1) decodable condition: For all user node u ∈ U and all
m,m′ ∈M with m 6= m′,
Φu(m, k) 6= Φu(m′, k′)
for all k, k′ ∈ K. This guarantees that any two message
are distinguishable at every user node.
2) secure condition: the message should be information-
theoretic secure, namely for all A ∈ A,
H(M |YA) = H(M). (1)
We would like to emphasize that the wiretappers can
know the encoding and decoding functions of the mes-
sage and the key at all the nodes.
We refer to a code satisfying 1) and 2) as an admissible code.
For an admissible code, we focus on the following two
performance parameters, the size of the message and the size
of the key:
1) the size of the message is measured by H(M), which
should be maximized;
2) the size of the key is measured by H(K), which should
be minimized.
Furthermore, we can define an achievable region for H(M)
and H(K), and what we have done in this paper is to
characterize this region.
B. Related Works
For set A ⊆ B, if |A| = r, then we refer to it as an r-subset
of B. In [5], the following result was obtained.
Theorem 1. Let q be the size of the transmission alphabet F ,
A consist of all the r-subsets of E and n = min
u∈U
maxflow(u).
Then
1) H(M) ≤ (n− r) log q;
2) H(K) ≥ rn−rH(M).
Moreover, when F is a finite field such that q > |A|, there
exists a linear admissible code which can achieve equalities in
these two bounds simultaneously; i.e., the size of the message
is maximized and the size of the key is minimized.
If all the logarithms are in the base q, then 1) becomes
1′) H(M) ≤ n− r.
Fig.1 illustrates the region of all (H(M), H(K)) that satisfy
1′) and 2). If time-sharing is allowed, then this is also the
region of all achievable (H(M), H(K)) because (n − r, r)
can be achieved by the code constructed in Cai & Yeung.
However, when A consists of arbitrary subsets of E , the
problem becomes very hard and very little is known about the
fundamental performance limit.
Example 1. In Fig.2, the source node is S and there are two
destination nodes U1 and U2, the channel set is E ={e1, e2,
..., e9}, where the channel capacity is unit. The message M
and the key K are generated at S, and then are sent through
the channels to U1 and U2. M is required to be decodable at
H(M)
H(K) H(M) ≤ n− r
H(K) ≥ rn−rH(M)(n− r, r)
O
Fig. 1. The achievable region of (H(M), H(K)).
Fig. 2. Secure network coding on the butterfly network.
both U1 and U2. If the set of wiretap sets A is {W : W ⊆
E , |W | = 1}, and for the wiretapper, it can access at most one
of the sets in A, then the optimal sizes of the message and the
key are known in [5]. If the set of wiretap sets A is arbitrary,
e.g., A = {{e1}, {e3}, {e5, e6}, {e5, e7}, {e6, e7}}, then the
bounds on H(K) and H(M) are unknown in the literature.
C. Main Results
In this work, we investigate the performance bounds when
A is arbitrary. The main results are summarized as follows:
1) We obtain an upper bound on H(M).
2) We propose a method to compute a lower bound on
H(K)/H(M), namely we obtain a lower bound on
H(K) in terms of H(M). We first propose a brute-
force algorithm for computing the lower bound. Then by
refining the brute-force algorithm, we obtain an algorithm
whose computational complexity is polynomial in |V| and
|E| when |A| is fixed. The lower bound obtained by these
algorithms is generally not tight. Nevertheless, we prove
that is tight for the classical point-to-point communication
system.
4In the following sections, we first prove an upper bound on
H(M) in Sections III – IV and a lower bound on H(K) in
Sections V – IX. Then we discuss the algorithms to compute
these bounds in Section X. In Section XI, we discuss the
tightness of the lower bound on H(K). At last, we conclude
the paper in Section XII.
III. BLOCKING SETS AND WIRETAP SETS
In this section, we introduce some notations and theorems,
which will be used to prove our results later.
Definition 1. For a network G = (V, E), we denote a cut
(graph cut) of G by (W,W c), where W ⊆ V contains the
source node s and W c = V \W contains the destination node
t, and denote the set of edges from W to W c by E(W,W c),
which is also abbreviated to EW .
We first state in the next lemma two key inequalities
obtained in [5].
Lemma 1. In the network G = (V, E), let (W,W c) be a cut
of G. A consists of all the r-subsets of E . If there exists an
admissible code on G, then for any wiretap set I ⊆ EW , we
have
(A1) H(M) ≤ H(YEW \I |YI);
(A2) H(K) ≥ H(YI).
The inequality (A1) was used in [5] to prove 1) and
2) of Theorem 1. The inequality (A2) was proved but no
further interpretation was provided. In this section, we extend
these two inequalities to a more general situation where A is
arbitrary. In the following discussion, unless otherwise stated,
I is assumed to be a wiretap set in A.
Definition 2. In the network G = (V, E), a set J ⊆ E is called
a blocking set if and only if there exists a cut (W,W c) such
that E(W,W c) ⊆ J .
The blocking set is a generalization of the graph cut. Let
u ∈ U . Since the message M can be decoded at user node
u and the symbols received at node u are functions of YEW ,
where W is a cut and EW is a subset of the blocking set J ,
we obtain that M is a function of YJ , namely
H(M |YJ) = 0. (2)
Proposition 1. Let A,B ⊂ E such that B ⊂ A. If
H(M |YA) = H(M), then H(M |YB) = H(M).
Proof: If H(M |YA) = H(M), and B ⊆ A, then
H(M |YB) ≥ H(M |YA) = H(M).
On the other hand,
H(M |YB) ≤ H(M).
Hence
H(M |YB) = H(M),
which completes the proof.
The next lemma is a simple generalization of Lemma 1,
which we will see is a very useful tool for obtaining perfor-
mance bounds for a general secure network coding problem.
Lemma 2. In the network G = (V, E), let J ⊆ E be a blocking
set. For any admissible code on G and any wiretap set I ⊆ J ,
we have
(B1) H(M) ≤ H(YJ\I |YI);
(B2) H(K) ≥ H(YI).
Proof: Since J is a blocking set, we obtain that
H(M |YJ) = 0. (3)
Since I ⊆ J is a wiretap set and the code is secure, we have
H(M |YI) = H(M). (4)
It follows that
H(M) = H(M |YI)−H(M |YJ)
= I(M ;YJ\I |YI)
≤ H(YJ\I |YI),
which completes the proof of (B1).
Since H(YI |M,K) = 0, I ⊆ J , and H(YI) = H(YI |M),
we obtain that
H(YI) = H(YI |M)−H(YI |M,K)
= I(YI ;K|M)
≤ H(K|M)
= H(K),
which completes the proof of (B2).
In the following, we will first prove an upper bound on
H(M). Then we will prove the lower bound on H(K).
IV. AN UPPER BOUND ON THE MESSAGE SIZE
From Lemma 2, we can immediately obtain an upper bound
on H(M).
Corollary 1. Let the size of the transmission alphabet F be
q. Let J be a blocking set and I ⊆ J be a wiretap set. For
any admissible code on G,
H(M) ≤ min
J,I:I⊆J
|J \ I| log q. (5)
Proof: By (B1) of Lemma 2, we have
H(M) ≤ H(YJ\I |YI)
≤ H(YJ\I)
≤ |J \ I| log q. (6)
Then the corollary is proved by minimizing over all J, I
such that I ⊆ J ,
H(M) ≤ min
J,I:I⊆J
|J \ I| log q.
From this bound, we see that if J \ I = ∅, then the upper
bound above vanishes, which implies H(M) = 0. This means
that if there exists a wiretap set I that contains a cut as its
subset, then the network cannot send any message, because J
can be taken to be I so that |J \ I| = 0.
Next we present two theorems for computing the upper
bound on H(M).
Lemma 3. For any fixed wiretap set I ,
min
J:I⊆J
|J \ I| = mincut(E \ I), (7)
5where mincut(E \ I) is the minimum cut of graph (V, E \ I).
Proof: Let (W,W c) be a graph cut and EW be the edges
across the cut. Then JW = EW
⋃
I is a blocking set. If we
consider only such blocking sets JW for J in (7), we have
min
J,I:I⊆J
|J \ I| ≤ min
JW
|JW \ I|
= min
EW
|EW \ I| = mincut(E \ I). (8)
The last equation is due to the fact that EW \ I corresponds
to the set of edges across a cut of E \ I , and vice versa.
Conversely, let J0 be a blocking set including I that
minimizes |J \ I|, and EW ⊆ J0. Then
min
J,I:I⊆J
|J \ I| = |J0 \ I| ≥ |EW \ I|
≥min
EW
|EW \ I| = mincut(E \ I). (9)
Together with (8), we can conclude the proof.
From Lemma 3, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2.
min
J,I:I⊆J
|J \ I| = min
I
mincut(E \ I).
By means of this corollary, since the mincut of a graph can
be computed in O(|V| · |E|) number of steps, we can compute
the upper bound on H(M) in Corollary 1 in O(|I| · |V| · |E|)
number of steps.
V. INFORMATION INEQUALITIES FOR JOINT ENTROPY
In this section, we state and explain some information
inequalities that are instrumental in proving the lower bound
on H(K).
Let [n] = {1, 2, ..., n}. For a subset α ⊆ [n], denote (Xi, i ∈
α) by Xα. Let α¯ = [n]\α. In information theory, the following
independence bound for joint entropy (e.g., p. 29 in [20]) is
well known.
H(X[n]) = H(X1, . . . , Xn) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(Xi).
This inequality provides an upper bound on the joint entropy
H(X[n]) in terms of the entropies of the individual random
variables. It is tight when the random variables X1, . . . , Xn
are mutually independent.
A. Han’s Inequalities
Han [21] generalized the independence bound to two se-
quences of inequalities, which are stated in the next two
theorems.
Theorem 2. For k = 1, 2, . . . , n, let
Hk =
1
(nk)
∑
α:|α|=k
H(Xα)
k .
Then
Hn ≤ Hn−1 ≤ · · · ≤ H1. (10)
In this theorem,
Hn =
1
n
H(X[n]) ≤ H1 = 1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Xi)
is equivalent to the independence bound. This sequence of
inequalities was used in [22] to prove a converse coding
theorem in multilevel diversity coding.
Theorem 3. For k = 1, 2, . . . , n, let
H ′k =
1
(nk)
∑
α:|α|=k
H(Xα|Xα¯)
k .
Then
H ′1 ≤ H ′2 ≤ · · · ≤ H ′n =
H(X[n])
n
. (11)
This sequence of inequalities was used in proving 2) in
Theorem 1.
B. Madiman-Tetali’s Inequalities
In Han’s inequalities, the term Hk (H ′k) only involves
the joint entropy (conditional joint entropy) of the k-subsets
of X[n]. These inequalities have recently been generalized
by Madiman and Tetali [23]. In the following, let C be an
arbitrary collection of subsets of [n].
Definition 3. A function α: C → R+ is called a fractional
covering if
∑
s∈C:i∈s α(s) ≥ 1 for each i ∈ [n].
Definition 4. A function β : C → R+ is called a fractional
packing, if
∑
s∈C:i∈s β(s) ≤ 1 for each i ∈ [n].
Theorem 4. For any collection C of subsets of [n], any
fractional covering α and any fractional packing β,∑
s∈C
β(s)H(Xs|Xsc) ≤ H(X[n]) ≤
∑
s∈C
α(s)H(Xs). (12)
In the rest of this work, we refer to the left hand side
of the inequality as the fractional packing inequality and the
right hand side of the inequality as the fractional covering
inequality.
Example 2. Let n = 3 and C = {C1, C2, C3}, where C1 =
{1, 2}, C2 = {2, 3} and C3 = {1, 3}.
By Han’s inequalities, we obtain that
1
2
H(X1,2|X3) + 1
2
H(X2,3|X1) + 1
2
H(X3,1|X2) ≤ H(X1,2,3)
≤ 1
2
H(X1,2) +
1
2
H(X2,3) +
1
2
H(X3,1). (13)
Let αi = α(Ci) and βi = β(Ci), i = 1, 2, 3. By Madiman-
Tetali’s inequalities, we obtain that
β1H(X1,2|X3) + β2H(X2,3|X1) + β3H(X3,1|X2)
≤ H(X1,2,3)
≤ α1H(X1,2) + α2H(X2,3) + α3H(X3,1) (14)
holds for any fractional covering α and any fractional packing
β, namely
α1, α2, α3 ≥ 0, α1 + α3 ≥ 1, α2 + α3 ≥ 1, α3 + α1 ≥ 1;
β1, β2, β3 ≥ 0, β1 + β3 ≤ 1, β2 + β3 ≤ 1, β3 + β1 ≤ 1.
In particular, when αi = 12 and βi =
1
2 for all i = 1, 2, 3, (14)
becomes (13). This shows that Madiman-Tetali’s inequalities
are more general than Han’s inequalities.
6When C1 = {1, 2}, C2 = {2, 3}, C3 = {2}, Han’s
inequalities are not applicable, while by Madiman-Tetali’s
inequalities, we have
β1H(X1,2|X3) + β2H(X2,3|X1) + β3H(X2|X1,3)
≤ H(X1,2,3)
≤ α1H(X1,2) + α2H(X2,3) + α3H(X2), (15)
where
α1 ≥ 1, α1 + α2 + α3 ≥ 1, α2 ≥ 1, and α1, α2, α3 ≥ 0;
β1 ≤ 1, β1 + β2 + β3 ≤ 1, β2 ≤ 1, and β1, β2, β3 ≥ 0.
Recently, Jiang et al. [24] have applied these inequalities to
multilevel diversity coding.
VI. THE FRACTIONAL PACKING BOUND
In this section, we prove a lower bound on H(K) by means
of the fractional packing inequality in (12).
Theorem 5. Fix a blocking set J and let β be a fractional
packing of {J \ I : I ⊆ J, I ∈ A}, then
H(K) ≥ max
β
∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)− 1
H(M) (16)
Proof: By (B1) of Lemma 2, we have
H(M) ≤ H(YJ\I |YI). (17)
By inequality (12), we obtain∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)H(M) ≤ ∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)H(YJ\I |YI) ≤ H(YJ).
Hence,
H(YJ) ≥
∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)H(M). (18)
From the definition of an admissible code, no keys are
generated and used at the intermediate nodes. Hence YJ is
a function of M and K. Then,
H(M) +H(K) ≥ H(M,K)
= H(M,K, YJ)
≥ H(YJ)
≥
∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)H(M). (19)
This implies,
H(K) ≥
∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)− 1
H(M). (20)
Since (20) holds for any fractional packing β, we have
H(K) ≥
max
β
∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)− 1
H(M), (21)
which completes the proof.
In order to evaluate the lower bound on H(K), we need to
consider the following LP (linear program),
max
∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I) (22)
s.t.
∑
I⊆J:i∈J\I β(J \ I) ≤ 1,∀i ∈ J.
In the following discussion, we define τ(J) = max
β
∑
I⊆J
β(J \
I)−1 for a fixed blocking set J , and let τ = max
J
τ(J). Since
in (22), any {β(J \ I) : I ⊆ J} satisfying
β(J \ I) ≥ 0,
∑
I:I⊆J
β(J \ I) = 1
is a feasible solution, we obtain that τ(J) ≥ 0 and τ ≥ 0.
Corollary 3. τ(J) > 0 if and only if for each edge e ∈ J , e
is covered by some wiretap sets.
Proof: If e ∈ J is not covered by any wiretap set, then
for all wiretap set I , e ∈ J \ I . By the LP in (22), we obtain
that the constraint from edge e is
d∑
i=1
βi ≤ 1, where d is the
number of wiretap sets. This constraint dominates any other
constraint, and the maximum is attained when this bound is
tight. Hence, τ(J) =
d∑
i=1
βi − 1 = 0.
Conversely, assume that for all e ∈ J , it is covered by at
least one wiretap set. Fix e, and we can assume that, without
lost of generality, e ∈ I1. Then we have e /∈ J \ I1, implying
that the number of sets J \ Ij (j 6= 1) which cover e is at
most d−1. Let βi = 1d−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Then βi is a feasible
solution, and hence τ(J) ≥
d∑
i=1
βi − 1 = 1/(d− 1) > 0.
Corollary 3 has the following implication. For a fixed J , if
there exists an edge e ∈ J such that e is not covered by any
wiretap set, then τ(J) = 0, and so
τ = max
J′
τ(J ′) = max
J′ 6=J
τ(J ′).
On the other hand, if every edge e ∈ J is covered by at least
one wiretap set, then τ(J) > 0, and so
τ = max
J′
τ(J ′) ≥ τ(J) > 0.
Therefore, for the purpose of computing τ , we assume without
loss of generality that every edge e ∈ J is covered by at least
one wiretap set.
VII. AN ALTERNATIVE BOUND
In the last section, we proved a lower bound on H(K) in
terms of fractional packings of {J \ I : I ⊆ J, I ∈ A} for
all blocking sets J . In this section, we prove an alternative
lower bound on H(K) in terms of fractional coverings of
{I : I ⊆ J, I ∈ A}. In the next section, we prove a duality
result between fractional packing and fractional covering that
implies the equivalence of these two bounds.
Fix a blocking set J . By (B2) of Lemma 2, for any wiretap
set I ⊆ J , we have
H(K) ≥ H(YI). (23)
7Let α be a fractional covering of {I : I ⊆ J}. By the fractional
covering inequality in (12), we obtain that
H(YJ) ≤
∑
I⊆J
α(I)H(YI) ≤
∑
I⊆J
α(I)H(K). (24)
Together with (18), we further obtain∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)H(M) ≤ H(YJ) ≤
∑
I⊆J
α(I)H(K). (25)
Then
H(K) ≥
∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)∑
I⊆J
α(I)
H(M). (26)
Maximizing over all β and minimizing over all α, we obtain
another lower bound on H(K) for a fixed J :
H(K) ≥
max
β
∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)
min
α
∑
I⊆J
α(I)
H(M). (27)
The maximization in the above has been considered in Sec-
tion VI. Thus in order to evaluate the above lower bound on
H(K), we also need to consider the following LP:
min
∑
α(I) (28)
s.t
∑
I⊆J:i∈I α(I) ≥ 1,∀i ∈ J.
VIII. A DUALITY RESULT
In this section, we prove that (27) is equivalent to (16).
Theorem 6. For a given blocking set J ,
max
β
∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)− 1
 = maxβ
∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)
min
α
∑
I⊆J
α(I)
,
where α is a fractional covering of {I : I ⊆ J, I ∈ A} and β
is a fractional packing of {J \ I : I ⊆ J, I ∈ A}.
In the following discussions, let
lC(J) = min
α
∑
I⊆J
α(I) (29)
and
lP (J) = max
β
∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I), (30)
where α is a fractional covering of {I : I ⊆ J} and β is a
fractional packing of {J \ I : I ⊆ J}.
Proof (Theorem 6): In this proof, since J is fixed, we can
use lC and lP instead of lC(J) and lP (J) without ambiguity.
We need to prove
lP − 1 = lP
lC
, (31)
namely
lC =
lP
lP − 1 or lP =
lC
lC − 1 . (32)
Let I1, I2, . . . , Id be the wiretap sets in J .
(1) Let α∗ =argmin
{∑
I⊆J
α(I)
}
and for each wiretap set
Ii, α∗i = α
∗(Ii). For 1 ≤ i ≤ d, define
sum =
d∑
i=1
α∗i and β
∗
i =
α∗i
sum− 1 . (33)
Next, we prove that {β∗i : 1 ≤ i ≤ d} is a feasible
solution to the LP in (22); i.e., there exists a fractional
packing β∗ on {J\Ii : 1 ≤ i ≤ d} such that β∗(J\Ii) =
β∗i .
For each e ∈ J , we can assume without loss of general-
ity that I1, . . . , Ij are the sets containing e and Ij+1, . . . ,
Id be the sets not containing e. Since {α∗i : 1 ≤ i ≤ d} is
a fractional covering,
j∑
i=1
α∗(Ii) ≥ 1. For every e ∈ J ,
since e /∈ J \ Is, for 1 ≤ s ≤ j and e ∈ J \ Is, for
j + 1 ≤ s ≤ d, we have
d∑
i=j+1
β∗(J \ Ii) =
d∑
i=j+1
α∗(Ii)
sum− 1 =
d∑
i=j+1
α∗(Ii)
sum− 1
=
sum−
j∑
i=1
α∗(Ii)
sum− 1 ≤
sum− 1
sum− 1 = 1.
Since lP is the maximum of the summation in (30) over
all fractional packing β, together with (33), we have
lP ≥
d∑
i=1
β∗i =
sum
sum− 1 =
lC
lC − 1 . (34)
(2) Let β∗ =argmax
{∑
I⊆J
β(J \ I)
}
and for each wiretap
set Ii, β∗i = β
∗(J \ Ii). For 1 ≤ i ≤ d, define
sum =
d∑
i=1
β∗i and α
∗
i =
β∗i
sum− 1 . (35)
Next, we prove that {α∗i : 1 ≤ i ≤ d} is a feasible
solution to the LP in (28); i.e., there exists a fractional
covering α∗ on {Ii : 1 ≤ i ≤ d} such that α∗(Ii) = α∗i .
For each e ∈ J , we can assume without loss of general-
ity that I1, . . . , Ij are the sets containing e and Ij+1, . . . ,
Id be the sets not containing e. Since {β∗i : 1 ≤ i ≤ d}
is a fractional packing,
d∑
i=j+1
β∗(J \ Ii) ≤ 1. For every
e ∈ J , since e /∈ J \ Is, for 1 ≤ s ≤ j and e ∈ J \ Is,
for j + 1 ≤ s ≤ d, we have
j∑
i=1
α∗(Ii) =
j∑
i=1
β∗(J \ Ii)
sum− 1 =
j∑
i=1
β∗(J \ Ii)
sum− 1
=
sum−
d∑
i=j+1
β∗(J \ Ii)
sum− 1 ≥
sum− 1
sum− 1 = 1.
8Since lC is the minimum of the summation in (29) over
all fractional covering α, together with (35), we have
lC ≤
d∑
i=1
α∗i =
sum
sum− 1 =
lP
lP − 1 . (36)
By (34) and (36), we obtain lC lP ≥ lC + lP ≥ lC lP ,
namely lC lP = lC + lP , which completes the proof.
By Theorem 5 and 6, the following bound is equivalent to
the bound in Theorem 5.
Theorem 7. Fix a blocking set J and let α be a fractional
covering of {I : I ⊆ J, I ∈ A}. Then
H(K) ≥ max
α
1∑
I⊆J
α(I)− 1H(M). (37)
By (32), we can write the lower bound in Theorem 5 or
7 as H(K)H(M) ≥ 1lC−1 and consider only the LP in (28). Since
τ = max
J
1/(lC(J) − 1) = max
J
(lP (J) − 1), we need to find
min
J
lC(J) or max
J
lP (J). In the following sections, we refer to
these two equivalent bounds as the fractional covering bound
and the fractional packing bound, respectively.
IX. SOME PROPERTIES OF THE LOWER BOUND
Consider the matrix form of the LP in (28) for the fractional
covering. Let I1, I2, . . . , Id be the wiretap sets. For each
blocking set J , construct a |J | × d matrix AJ to represent the
edges in J as follows. Let eJ1 , e
J
2 , . . . , e
J
|J| be the edges in
J . If eJi ∈ Ij , then AJ(i, j) = 1, else AJ(i, j) = 0. Each
column of AJ corresponds to a wiretap set, and each row of
AJ corresponds to an edge in J .
We can now write the LP in (28) and its dual as
LP : min 1Tx Dual : max 1T y
s.t AJx ≥ 1 s.t ATJ y ≤ 1
x ≥ 0 y ≥ 0
The strong duality theorem in linear programming (Theorem
14 in the appendix) states that the LP and its dual problem
have the same optimal value.
When we try to solve the above LP, we need to consider
some special relations among the wiretap sets and the blocking
sets, namely a wiretap set is a subset of another wiretap set, or
a blocking set is a subset of another blocking set. We discuss
these issues in the following.
Corollary 4. For a given blocking set J , if wiretap sets Ii and
Ij satisfy Ii ⊆ Ij ⊆ J , then Ii can be ignored in the model.
Proof: For wiretap sets Ii, Ij ⊆ J , if Ii ⊆ Ij , then the
ith and jth column of AJ satisfy AiJ ≤ AjJ componentwise,
which implies in the dual problem the constraint (AiJ)
T y ≤ 1
is dominated by the constraint (AjJ)
T y ≤ 1. Thus we can
ignore the column AiJ in AJ , or equivalently, the wiretap set
Ii.
In the following discussion, we assume that Ii (1 ≤ i ≤ d)
is not a subset of any other wiretap sets.
Corollary 5. If the blocking sets J ′, J satisfy J ′ ⊆ J , then
τ(J) ≤ τ(J ′).
Proof: By definition, if J ′ ⊆ J , then AJ′ is a submatrix of
AJ . By comparing the linear programs for J ′ and J , we notice
that the two objective functions are the same, but the feasible
region of J is a subset of that of J ′, because AJ′ is a submatrix
of AJ . Since we need to obtain the minimum value of the
objective function, we have lC(J ′) ≤ lC(J), where lC(J ′)
and lC(J) are the optimal values for J ′ and J , respectively.
Then τ(J ′) = 1/(l(J ′)C−1) ≥ 1/(l(J)C−1) = τ(J), which
concludes the proof.
This corollary implies that toward computing τ =
max
J
τ(J), if J ′ ⊆ J ′′, then J ′′ can be ignored. In particular,
since each blocking set contains a graph cut (also a blocking
set), toward computing τ , it is attained over all graph cuts
between the source and destination nodes.
In the following sections, we will discuss the algorithms on
computing the bound on H(K)/H(m) and the tightness of
our bound.
X. ALGORITHMS FOR COMPUTING THE LOWER BOUND
A. A Brute Force Algorithm
Based on the above discussion, we propose a brute force
algorithm, namely that we enumerate all the graph cuts and
solve the corresponding LPs (e.g., by the simplex algorithm).
Then the time complexity is 2|V|O(LP ), where O(LP ) is the
time complexity of the LP; e.g., the interior point algorithm
can terminate in O(m2n + m3) arithmetic operations, where
m is number of constraints and n is the number of variables.
Theorem 8. Sperner’s Theorem [25]: If A1, A2, ..., Am are
subsets of N := {1, 2, ..., n} such that Ai is not a subset of
Aj if i 6= j, then m ≤
(
n
bn2 c
)
.
When solving the LP, the primary factors of the complexity
are the number of variables and constraints, namely the
number of wiretap sets d and |J |. By Theorem 8, since for
every two wiretap sets Ii and Ij , Ii is not a subset of Ij if
i 6= j, we obtain d ≤ ( |J|b |J|2 c).
In this algorithm, the total complexity is exponential, which
is not practical when the problem size is large. Next we
propose an algorithm which is polynomial when d is constant.
B. A Polynomial-Time Algorithm
In this part we show that when the number of wiretap
sets, d, is a constant, there exists a polynomial algorithm for
computing the lower bound. In the following discussion, we
use some definitions and theorems in linear optimization which
are given in the appendix.
In the above brute force algorithm, we consider every
blocking set J and solve the following linear program for J :
LP(J) : min 1Tx
s.t. AJx ≥ 1
x ≥ 0, x ∈ Rd.
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(
AJ
Id×d
)
and bJ =
(
1|J|
0d
)
, where Id×d
is the d× d identity matrix, then the above constraints can be
written as A′Jx ≥ bJ .
Let P = {x ∈ Rd | AJx ≥ 1, x ≥ 0}. Since x = 1d ∈ P ,
P is a nonempty polyhedron. Since A′J contains Id×d as a
submatrix, we see that there exist d rows of A′J which are
linearly independent. So by Theorem 12 (in Appendix A), the
polyhedron P has at least one extreme point. Since x ≥ 0, the
optimal value is nonnegative, and hence not equal to −∞. By
Theorem 13, there exists an extreme point which is optimal.
Let x∗(J) denote an extreme point (not necessary unique)
that gives the optimal solution. Then by Theorem 11, x∗(J)
is a basic feasible solution. A straightforward method to find
x∗(J) is to enumerate all the basic solutions of LP (J), and
check whether the basic solutions are feasible or not. In order
to enumerate all the basic feasible solutions, we consider all
d × d submatrices of A′J . For such a submatrix S, there is a
corresponding basic solution if and only if rank(S) = d, and
if so, denote this basic solution by xS . Then a basic solution
xS is feasible if A′JxS ≥ bJ . Among all these basic feasible
solutions, x∗(J) is the one that attains the minimum value.
To sum up, we draw the following conclusion.
Conclusion 1. For blocking set J , the optimal solution can
be obtained by solving one of the equations: Sx = bS , where
S is a d × d submatrix of A′J and bS is the corresponding
subvector of bJ .
Furthermore, to obtain the best lower bound on H(K)H(M) ,
we need to solve the linear program to obtain the optimal
value for each blocking set. Then take the minimum of these
optimal values over all blocking sets to obtain the best lower
bound. This can be achieved by repeating the procedure in
Conclusion 1.
The method described above is inefficient because if S is a
submatrix of both A′J1 and A
′
J2
for two different blocking sets
J1 and J2, the exact same processing of S would be performed
twice. In the remaining of this section, we aim to improve the
method by removing such redundant operations.
In the method described above, if we obtain the best lower
bound on H(K)H(M) from blocking set J , we refer to the optimal
value and the optimal solution of LP (J) as the best optimal
value and the best optimal solution. Recall that for each
blocking set J , since J ⊆ E , A′J is a submatrix of A′E (E
is a blocking set so A′E is defined accordingly). Then we can
draw another conclusion.
Conclusion 2. Consider the best lower bound on H(K)H(M) in
network G = (V, E). The best optimal solution can be obtained
by solving one of the equations Sx = bS , where S is a d× d
submatrix of A′E and bS is the corresponding subvector of bE .
Definition 5. For each blocking set J , let QJ be the set of all
basic feasible solutions of LP (J), and let Q =
⋃
J
QJ .
Let γ =
(|E|+d
d
)
. By Conclusion 2, the best optimal value is
min
x∈Q
1Tx. If we compute the set Q by means of the prescription
in Definition 5, we need to enumerate all the blocking sets, and
hence the computational complexity is exponential in |E|. But
we notice that matrix A′E has γ submatrices with dimension
d × d and each of them corresponds to at most one basic
feasible solution, and so |Q| ≤ γ. When d is a constant, γ
is polynomial in |E|, which suggests that if we compute Q
by enumerating these γ d× d submatrices, we may obtain an
algorithm which is polynomial in |E|. By the definition of Q,
for each d×d submatrix S, if rank(S) < d, we cannot obtain
a basic solution from Sx = bS . Therefore, we only need to
consider S such that
1) rank(S) = d.
When S satisfies 1), Sx = bS has a unique solution, which
we denote by xS . In the sequel, whenever we discuss xS ,
we implicitly assume that S satisfies 1), otherwise xS is
undefined. If xS is feasible for some blocking set J , namely
A′JxS ≥ bJ , then xS satisfies
2) xS ≥ 0.
Let Q′ be the set of all xS satisfying 2). Then Q ⊆ Q′ and Q′
can be computed in polynomial time. Now we need to solve
the following problem: if x ∈ Q′, what is the necessary and
sufficient condition for x ∈ Q?
For each edge e ∈ E , let (ae)T denote the row of AE
corresponding to e. For each xS ∈ Q′, let F (S) = {e ∈
E|(ae)TxS ≥ 1}.
Theorem 9. Let xS ∈ Q′. Then xS ∈ Q if and only if F (S)
is a blocking set.
Proof: “⇒” For xS ∈ Q′, if xS ∈ Q, then xS is a
basic feasible solution of LP (J) for some blocking set J .
By A′JxS ≥ bJ , we obtain that for each e ∈ J , (ae)TxS ≥ 1,
which means e ∈ F (S), implying J ⊆ F (S). Hence F (S) is
a blocking set.
“⇐” Recall that A′E =
(
AJ
Id×d
)
. For a d × d submatrix
S of A′E , let ES be the set consisting of all e ∈ E such that
e corresponds to a row of S. By the definition of xS , we
have that for each e ∈ ES , (ae)TxS = 1, which means that
e ∈ F (S), implying that ES ⊆ F (S). Let J = F (S). Then J
is a blocking set. For e ∈ J , (ae)TxS ≥ 1, namely AJxS ≥ 1.
Together with xS ≥ 0, we have A′JxS ≥ bJ . Since SxS = bS
and S is a d × d submatrix of A′J , xS is a basic feasible
solution of LP (J), and hence xS ∈ Q.
By Theorem 9, for xS ∈ Q′, in order to determine
whether xS ∈ Q, we only need to check whether F (S)
is a blocking set. This can be done in polynomial time as
follows. In the graph G = (V, E), upon deleting all the edges
in F (S), we need to check whether the source node and the
destination node are connected in the residual graph, which
can be achieved via a Depth-First Search (DFS) algorithm
(e.g., in [26]) with time complexity O(|V| + |E|). Based on
the these results, we propose Algorithm 1 on the next page
for computing the lower bound on H(K)/H(M).
The time complexity analysis of Algorithm 1 is as follows:
1. In step a), the time for calculating all xS is O(γ ∗ d3),
where d3 is the time for matrix inversion by Gaussian
elimination.
2. In step b), in the worst case, we need to enumerate all the
γ submatrices. For each submatrix S, there are at most |E|
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for computing a lower bound on
H(K)
H(M)
a) For each d × d submatrix S of A′E , keep the matrix
provided that it satisfies rank(S) = d and xS ≥ 0.
b) For each S that survives in a), calculate F (S), and
determine whether F (S) is a blocking set. If so, calculate
val(S) = 1Td xS, else ignore S.
c) Output S and xS that attain the minimum val(S).
edges in F (S), and so we have to delete at most |E| edges
in graph G = (V, E). The complexity for determining
whether F (S) is a blocking set is O(|V|+ |E|). In sum,
the time complexity of this step is O(γ ∗ (|V|+ |E|)).
3. With steps a) and b) together, the total complexity is
O(γ ∗ d3 + γ ∗ (|V|+ |E|)) = O(|E|d(|V|+ |E|)), which
is polynomial when d is a constant.
XI. TIGHTNESS OF THE LOWER BOUND
In this section, we discuss tightness of the lower bound on
H(K)/H(M) obtained by Algorithm 1. In Cai and Yeung [9],
a security condition for multi-source linear network coding
was proved. This condition, stated in the next theorem, is
instrumental in the discussion in this section. For the sake
of completeness, we include in Appendix B a proof of this
theorem which is somewhat simpler than the proof in [9].
In the sequel, let Fq be a finite field of size q and F rq =
Fq × Fq...× Fq︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
. For a matrix A, we also write the number of
rows and columns of A as row(A) and col(A), respectively.
Theorem 10. Let A and B be given matrices defined on F . Let
M be a random vector with positive probability distribution
on Fmq and K be a uniformly distributed random vector on
F kq . Let Y =
(
A B
)( M
K
)
and C =
(
A B
)
and
assume that rank(C) is equal to the number of rows of C.
Then the following are equivalent:
a) M and Y are independent, namely I(Y ;M) = 0;
b) rank(B) = row(B), or equivalently, rank(B) =
rank(C).
In practice, when q → ∞, the matrix C can be generated
randomly. With high probability approaching 1, rank(C) is
equal to the rows of C.
A. When the Best Lower bound is Zero
In this case, the lower bound on H(K)/H(M) is tight as
we now show. By τ = max
J
τ(J) = 0, we obtain that for
each blocking set J , τ(J) = 0. In Corollary 3, by letting J
be an arbitrary graph cut (W,W c) of network G = (V, E), we
see that there exists an edge e ∈ E(W,W c) such that e is
not contained in any wiretap set. Hence in G = (V, E), if we
delete all the edges which are contained in some wiretap sets,
then the number of remaining edges in each graph cut is at
least 1. By the max-flow min-cut theorem, there exists a path
P from the source node to the destination node and all the
edges in P are not contained in any wiretap sets. So we can
send a message M along P without mixing it with a random
key. For such a scheme, H(M) > 0 and H(K) = 0, implying
that the bound H(K)/H(M) ≥ 0 is tight.
B. Point-to-Point Communication System
In this section, we prove that in a point-to-point commu-
nication system, the lower bound on H(K)/H(M) is tight.
Consider such a system. Let s and u be the source node and the
destination node, respectively. Let h be the number of edges
from node s to node u and I1, I2, . . . , Id be the wiretap sets.
We now write the LP in (28) and its dual as follows
Primal : min 1Tx Dual : max 1T y
s.t AJx ≥ 1 s.t ATJ y ≤ 1
x ≥ 0, x ∈ Rd y ≥ 0, y ∈ Rh
(38)
Since the primal has an optimal solution x∗, by the strong
duality theorem in linear optimization (Theorem 14 in the
appendix), the dual also has an optimal solution y∗ and
1Tx∗ = 1T y∗. Next we prove that the lower bound on
H(K)
H(M) can be achieved, namely there exists a code such that
H(M) = (1T y∗ − 1)H(K).
Proposition 2. There exists an optimal solution y∗ such that
all its entries are rational numbers.
Proof: By Conclusion 1, there exists an extreme point
y∗ which is optimal. This extreme point can be obtained by
solving a particular set of linear equations, whose coefficients
are rational numbers. Hence we conclude that y∗ is also
rational.
Let y∗ = (a1/b1, a2/b2, . . . , ah/bh)T , where ai, bi ∈ N
and gcd(ai, bi) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ h. Let g = lcm(b1, b2, ...,
bh), and wi = g · ai/bi, wi ∈ N. Let wmax = max
1≤i≤h
wi and
w =
(
h∑
i=1
wi − g
)
. Then 1T y∗ − 1 = wg . Let M and K be
uniformly distributed on F gq and F
w
q , respectively. Next, we
prove that there exists a linear code with transmission alphabet
F = Fwmaxq such that H(K) = g and H(M) = w (where the
logarithm is in the base q), and on each edge ei (1 ≤ i ≤ h),
the codeword is a vector defined on Fwiq . By appending to the
codeword a zero vector of length wmax − wi, the codeword
becomes a vector in F . When wi = 0, we transmit nothing on
edge ei, so we can ignore edge ei. In the following, without
loss of generality, we assume that wi > 0.
Proposition 3. There exists a wiretap set I such that∑
ei∈I
wi = g.
Proof: Since y∗ is a basic feasible solution of the dual
problem in (38), we can find matrix C such that
Cy∗ =
(
1n1
0n2
)
, (39)
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where C is an invertible h × h submatrix of
(
ATJ
Ih×h
)
and n1 + n2 = h. In the dual problem, we can see that
y0 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rh is a feasible solution and 1T y0 = 1.
Therefore, 1T y∗ ≥ 1T y0 = 1. If n1 = 0, then y∗ = 0, so that
1T y∗ = 0, a contradiction. Hence, n1 > 0. Then we obtain
from (39) that
C

w1
w2
...
wh
 =

g
g
...
0
 . (40)
Letting I be the wiretap set that corresponds to the first row
of C, we have
∑
ei∈I
wi = g.
Without loss of generality, we can let the wiretap set I
prescribed in Proposition 3 be Id = {et+1, et+2, . . . , eh},
so that the edges apart from those in Id are e1, e2, . . . , et.
Then for each Ii where 1 ≤ i ≤ d − 1, by ATJ y∗ ≤ 1 and
y∗ = (w1/g, w2/g, . . . , wh/g), we have∑
j:ej∈Ii
wj ≤ g (41)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1.
We assume
M =

m1
m2
...
mt
 ∈ Fwq , (42)
where mi ∈ Fwiq (1 ≤ i ≤ t). Let Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ h) be a wi× g
matrix defined on Fq to be specified later. Let the symbol
transmitted on edge ei be
Yi = mi +BiK, (43)
where Yi ∈ Fwiq , 1 ≤ i ≤ t, and let
YId = BIdK, (44)
where
BId =

Bt+1
Bt+2
...
Bh
 (45)
is the g× g identity matrix on Fq . Namely, for t+ 1 ≤ i ≤ h,
the symbol transmitted on edge ei is
Yi = BiK. (46)
Let Y be the symbols transmitted on all the edges. Then we
can write
Y =

Y1
Y2
...
Yt
YId

=

D1 0 0 ... 0 B1
0 D2 0 ... 0 B2
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 ... 0 Dt Bt
0 0 ... 0 0 BId


m1
m2
...
mt
K
 (47)
where Di, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, is the wi × wi identity matrix.
For a matrix A, we denote the vector space spanned by the
rows of A by rowspan(A). For each ei (1 ≤ i ≤ h), let Vi =
rowspan(0, ..., Di, ..., 0, Bi) (the row space of the ith row in
(47)). From the above construction, we have dim(Vi) = wi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ h and dim(V1 ⊕ V2 ⊕ ... ⊕Vh) =
h∑
i=1
wi.
In the code we have constructed, we see from (43) that
the g symbols of the key K are sent on the edges in Id.
Therefore, I(YId ;M) = 0. The following lemma, which is a
refinement of Lemma 3 in [5], is instrumental for constructing
Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Lemma 4. Let V1, V2, ..., Vm be vector subspaces on Fnq , and
dim(Vi) = di (1 ≤ i ≤ m). If d ≥ 0 and d+di ≤ n (1 ≤ i ≤
m), then for q > m, there exists a vector subspace V of Fnq ,
such that dim(V ) = d and dim(V ⊕Vi) = dim(V )+dim(Vi)
(1 ≤ i ≤ m).
Proof: Let {b1, b2, ..., bd} be a basis of V . For all 1 ≤
i ≤ m, let {vi1, vi2, ..., vidi} be a maximally independent set
of vectors in Vi. We construct {b1, b2, ..., bd} by induction. It
suffices to show that for 1 ≤ j ≤ d, if b1, b2, ..., bj−1 have
been chosen such that for all Vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
b1, b2, ..., bj−1, vi1, vi2, ..., vidi (48)
are linearly independent, then it is possible to choose bj such
that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
b1, b2, ..., bj−1, bj , vi1, vi2, ..., vidi (49)
are linearly independent. Specifically, bj is chosen such that it
is independent of the set of vectors in (48) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
i.e.,
bj ∈ Fnq \ ∪1≤i≤m〈b1, b2, ..., bj−1, vi1, vi2, ..., vidi〉. (50)
Since the cardinality of a subspace in Fnq is finite, we need to
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show that the set above is nonempty.∣∣∣∣ ⋃
1≤i≤m
〈b1, b2, ..., bj−1, vi1, vi2, ..., vidi〉
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
1≤i≤m
∣∣∣∣〈b1, b2, ..., bj−1, vi1, vi2, ..., vidi〉∣∣∣∣
=
∑
1≤i≤m
qdi+j−1
≤
∑
1≤i≤m
qn−1 (for di + j ≤ di + d ≤ n)
= mqn−1.
Therefore,∣∣∣∣Fnq \ ⋃
1≤i≤m
〈b1, b2, ..., bj−1, vi1, vi2, ..., vidi〉
∣∣∣∣
≥ qn −mqn−1
= qn−1(q −m)
> 0,
since q > m. Hence bj can be chosen for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
In the following, we construct Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ t to satisfy
the secure condition: for each wiretap set I , I(YI ;M) = 0.
Since the symbols transmitted on the edges in wiretap set Ii =
{ei1 , ei2 , ..., ei|Ii|} (1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1) are
Yi1
Yi2
...
Yi|Ii|
 = (51)

0 ... Di1 ... ... ... Bi1
0 ... ... Di2 ... ... Bi2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 ... ... ... Di|Ii| ... Bi|Ii|


m1
m2
...
mt
K
 ,
(52)
by Theorem 10, for each wiretap set Ii (1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1), if
Ti =

Bi1
Bi2
...
Bi|Ii|
 (53)
satisfies b) of Theorem 10, namely
dim(Ti) = row(Ti) =
|Ii|∑
j=1
row(Bij ) =
|Ii|∑
j=1
wij , (54)
then for Ii, the secure condition holds.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ d − 1, we define matrix T 0i as follows: if
Ii ∩ Id = {ej1 , ej2 , ..., ejr}, then
T 0i =

Bj1
Bj2
...
Bjr
 , (55)
else T 0i is the empty matrix. For each i, T
l
i for 1 ≤ l ≤ t are
defined inductively as follows: if el ∈ Ii, then
T li =
(
T l−1i
Bl
)
,
else
T li = T
l−1
i .
We can verify that for 1 ≤ i ≤ d − 1, the rows of T ti are a
permutation of the rows of Ti. Hence, (54) holds if and only
if
dim(T ti ) = row(T
t
i ). (56)
Now, we construct Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ t one by one starting from
B1. For each l, 1 ≤ l ≤ t, we need to construct Bl such that
T li satisfies b) of Theorem 10; i.e.,
dim(T li ) = row(T
l
i ), (57)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1.
Before we construct B1, for wiretap set Ii (1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1),
since BId is an identity matrix, if Ii ∩ Id 6= ∅, then
dim(T 0i ) =
∑
j:ej∈Ii∩Id
wj = row(T
0
i ),
else dim(T 0i ) = 0. For either case, (57) holds.
For B1, row(B1) = w1, and it is required that if e1 ∈ Ii,
dim(T 1i ) = row(T
1
i )
= row(T 0i ) + row(B1)
= row(T 0i ) + w1, (58)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ d − 1. By (41), if e1 ∈ Ii (1 ≤ i ≤ d − 1), we
have
row(T 0i ) + w1 =
∑
j:ej∈Ii∩Id
wj + w1
≤
∑
j:ej∈Ii
wj
≤ g. (59)
By (59) and Lemma 4, we can construct a w1 × g matrix B1
to satisfy (58), and hence (57) is satisfied for l = 1.
We assume that for a fixed l′, where 1 ≤ l′ ≤ t − 1,
B1, B2, ..., Bl′ have been constructed so that (57) is satisfied
for 1 ≤ l ≤ l′. Then
dim(T l
′
i ) = row(T
l′
i ) =
∑
j:ej∈Ii∩Id
wj +
∑
j:ej∈Ii,j≤l′
wj . (60)
For Bl′+1, row(Bl′+1) = wl′+1, and it is required that if
el′+1 ∈ Ii,
dim(T l
′+1
i ) = row(T
l′+1
i ) = row(T
l′
i ) + wl′+1. (61)
By (41) and (60), if el′+1 ∈ Ii,
row(T l
′
i ) + wl′+1 =
∑
j:ej∈Ii∩Id
wj +
∑
j:ej∈Ii, j≤l′+1
wj
≤
∑
j:ej∈Ii
wj
≤ g. (62)
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By Lemma 4 and (62), we can construct a wl′+1 × g matrix
Bl′+1 such that (61) holds, and hence (57) is satisfied for l =
l′ + 1. By mathematical induction, we can construct Bi, 1 ≤
i ≤ t.
The decoding can be done as follows. We first obtain K
from wiretap set Id. Then yi can be solved for all 1 ≤ i ≤ h
and by (43) we obtain that mi = Yi −BiK for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
For the code we have constructed, H(M) = w and H(K) =
g, so that H(M)/H(K) = w/g = 1T y∗−1 as desired. Hence
the lower bound on H(K)/H(M) by Algorithm 1 is tight.
Now, we give an example to demonstrate our lower bound
on H(K)/H(M).
Example 3. Let {e1, e2, e3} be a cut-set. The set of wiretap
sets A = {A1, A2}, where A1 = {e1, e2}, A2 = {e2, e3} are
two wiretap sets. By the fractional covering bound, we have
max x1 + x2 + x3 (63)
s.t. x1 + x2 ≤ 1; (64)
x2 + x3 ≤ 1; (65)
0 ≤ x1, x2, x3 ≤ 1; (66)
It is easy to see x1 = x3 = 1, x2 = 0 is an optimal solution.
Hence
H(K)
H(M)
≥ 1
x1 + x2 + x3 − 1 = 1. (67)
Let H(K) = 1. From our construction of the code that
achieves the lower bound, we see that xi (i = 1, 2, 3) can
be interpreted as the information rate on channel ei, with
the information transmitted on channel e1, e2, and e3 being
mutually independent. The constraints (64) and (65) mean the
size of the symbols in each wiretap set cannot exceed the size
of the key, which is similar to Shannon’s perfect secrecy.
On the other hand, we cannot directly apply the bounds in
Cai & Yeung [5] since A does not contain the set {e1, e3}. If
we consider a weaker set of wiretap sets A′ = {A′1, A′2, A′3},
where A′1 = {e1}, A′2 = {e2}, and A′3 = {e3}. By the bounds
in Cai & Yeung [5], we have
H(K)
H(M)
≥ 1
2
, (68)
which is strictly less than our bound.
XII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have obtained an upper bound on the size
of the message and a lower bound on the size of the key for
a secure network code on a wiretap network, when the set of
wiretap sets A is arbitrary. The lower bound on the size of the
key is obtained via a set of entropy inequalities by Madiman
and Tetali [23]. The bound on H(K) consists of a fractional
covering bound and a fractional packing bound, which can
be proved to be equivalent. Computation of this bound can
be achieved in polynomial time when |A| is fixed, and it is
tight for the special case of the point-to-point communication
system. That is, from the perspective of cut-set bound, our
lower bound on H(K) is optimal. Compared to the existing
bounds, our bound is more general to outperform all of them.
Consider the region of points (H(M), H(K)), our result has
established an outer bound on the achievable region. Moreover,
our bounds have characterized the performance of routing,
which is a special network code and can be simplified as a
point-to-point communication system.
APPENDIX A
LINEAR OPTIMIZATION
In this appendix, we present some standard definitions and
theorems in linear optimization taken from [27].
Definition 6. A polyhedron is a set that can be described in
the form {x ∈ Rn|Ax ≥ b}, where A is an m× n matrix and
b is a vector in Rm.
Definition 7. Let P be a polyhedron. A vector x ∈ P is an
extreme point of P if we cannot find two vectors y, z ∈ P ,
both different from x, and a scalar λ ∈ [0, 1], such that x =
λy + (1− λ)z.
Definition 8. Let P be a polyhedron. A vector x ∈ P is a
vertex of P if there exists some c′ such that cx′ < c′y for all
y satisfying y ∈ P and y 6= x.
Definition 9. Consider a polyhedron P defined by linear
equality and inequality constraints, and let x∗ be an element
of Rn.
(a) The vector x∗ is a basic solution if:
1) All equality constraints are active.
2) Out of the constraints that are active at x∗, there
are n of them that are linearly independent.
(b) If x∗ is a basic solution that satisfies all of the constraints,
we say that it is a basic feasible solution.
Theorem 11. Let P be a nonempty polyhedron and let x∗ ∈
P . Then, the following are equivalent:
(a) x∗ is a vertex;
(b) x∗ is an extreme point;
(c) x∗ is a basic feasible solution.
Definition 10. A polyhedron P ⊂ Rn contains a line if there
exists a vector x ∈ P and a nonzero vector d ∈ Rn such that
x+ λd ∈ P for all scalars λ.
Theorem 12. Suppose that the polyhedron P = {x ∈
Rn|a′ix ≥ bi, i = 1, ...,m} is nonempty. Then, the following
are equivalent:
(a) The polyhedron P has at least one extreme point.
(b) The polyhedron P does not contain a line.
(c) There exists n vectors out of the family a1, ..., am, which
are linearly independent.
Theorem 13. Consider the linear programming problem of
minimizing c′x over a polyhedron P. Suppose that P has at
least one extreme point. Then, either the optimal cost is equal
to −∞, or there exists an extreme point which is optimal.
Theorem 14 (Strong duality). If a linear programming prob-
lem has an optimal solution, so does its dual, and the respec-
tive optimal costs are equal.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF TO THEOREM 10
Proof: “a)⇒ b)” Since rank(C) = row(C), we have
row(C) ≤ col(C).
Then for each Y = y, the equation y = AM + BK has at
least one solution for (M,K), which means
Pr(Y = y) > 0.
Together with Pr(M = m) > 0 and I(Y ;M) = 0, we obtain
that
Pr(Y = y,M = m) = Pr(Y = y)Pr(M = m) > 0,
namely for each y and m, the equation y = Am+BK has at
least one solution for K. Since BK = y−Am has at least one
solution for arbitrary (y,m), we obtain rank(B) = row(B).
“b) ⇒ a)” Let W = AM , V = BK and r = rank(B).
Since K is uniformly distributed, V is uniformly distributed
on F rq . Since row(Y ) = row(V ),
H(Y ) ≤ log |F rq | = H(V ) = H(BK).
On the other hand,
H(Y ) = H(Y |M) + I(Y ;M)
≥ H(Y |M)
= H(AM +BK|M)
= H(BK|M)
= H(BK),
which means that H(Y ) ≥ H(BK) and the equality holds if
and only if I(Y ;M) = 0.
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